History as Science
The workshop Undercurrents of History is based
on the premise that there is mechanism for history. Jared Diamond in Guns,
Germs, and Steel [GGS] quotes approvingly the German statesman Bismarck
as saying: "The statesman's task is to hear God's footsteps marching
through history and to try to catch on His coattails as He marches past"
(p. 420). I will paraphrase that statement as “leaders do not really
lead, they sense what is coming and/or what the people want and then the
leaders express it by word and action.”
Often it is hard to give proper credit to leaders. Alexander is called
the Great but his father Phillip had prepared the Macedonian war machine
and he was ready to invade Persia when he was assassinated.
Diamond [ibid] devotes a long epilogue on the
challenges of studying history as a science. The main challenge is that
complex dynamic systems are chaotic, namely they are determinist
and at the same time unpredictable. (Diamond does not use the term "chaotic"
but he describes historical process as being both deterministic and unpredictable.)
The best known example of a chaotic system is the physical process responsible
for the weather. We can make broad predictions but not precise ones. In
the same way we can predict that a country that runs large budget deficits
will eventually be unable to pay its bond-holders but we cannot say when
exactly this is going to happen.
So history is a science, not as precise as particle physics
but as messy as the study of the weather. I use the term "undercurrent"
to refer to all these processes that affect historical events, even if
the connection is not always obvious. This is analogous to the effects
of the Gulf Stream on the weather of both eastern North America and western
Europe.
[GGS] demonstrates that environmental conditions such
as suitability of local flora and fauna for domestication and the attractiveness
of hunting-gathering determine when a human society committed
itself to food production (agriculture, domesticated animals). That in
turn is a good predictor of development. Environmental and geographical
factors explain why China (food production started around 7500 BCE) and
the countries around the Mediterranean (food production started in various
locations between 8500 BCE and 6000 BCE) had a head start. In contrast
food production in the Americas did not start until 3500 BCE. As a result
American Indians had no chance against the European invaders (or "discoverers").
However, those broad factors do not explain the relative
performance of different "advanced" regions and why the role
of the dominant power changes over time. A question that is frequently
asked is why the American continents were "discovered" by Europeans
rather than by Chinese explorers, even though China had more advanced
ship building than Europe.
Another question is why Western Europe moved so far ahead
of the rest of the world and in particular of the Middle East, even though
until around 1200 the Middle East was more advanced. Gibbon makes an interesting
observation: "The most civilized nations of modern Europe issued
from the woods of Germany, and in the rude institutions of these barbarians
we may still distinguish the original principles of our laws and manners"
[EG, Chapter 9, p. 208]. This is a paradox: the backward people overcame
the more advanced.
When we look at the flow of history in modern times the
environmental factors mentioned in [GGS] are no longer at play and the
intelligence of the people in a country does not seem to be a factor because
there are no significant differences from country to country. In an Afterward
[GGS] points out the importance of institutions and also that "institutions
are not born out of thin air." The last few sentences of that book
point to the prosperity of countries like Japan and South Korea compared
to the poverty of New Guinea and the Philippines as explainable by the
much earlier start of food production in the first group. However, that
explanation fails in the case of Europe and the Middle East. 3000 years
ago Iraq and Egypt were far more advanced than England and Germany while
the opposite is true now.
What we are left with are societal dynamics and the possibility
that an organization that is beneficial at one time becomes detrimental
later on. Those of you who remember their high school physics may find
the following example illustrative. A pendulum moves between two high
points A and B while passing through a center C. From A to C gravity acts
as an accelerant while between C and B gravity slows the pendulum down.
Think of the tendency to introduce control of the people by the leaders
as an analogue to gravity. Introducing order in a disorderly society helps
prosperity. But as control increases it becomes counterproductive.
[GGS] (and others) distinguish four levels of human organization:
bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Bands usually contain about 100
people, members of an extended family. At the other end states are entities
in excess of 50,000 people with leaders, priests, bureaucrats and the
like. However, lumping all states together misses a lot of distinctions
that are very important in the history of the world during the last 3000
years. The big question is whether there is a scientific way to describe
the evolution of a state. States differ significantly from each other
in longevity. The Roman Empire lasted over 1000 years (1700 if we include
the years of the Roman republic and the years from the battle of Manzikert
in 1070 to the fall of Constantinople in 1453), the British state has
lasted so far almost 1000 years (using the battle of Hastings in 1066
as its start), and the Ottoman Empire lasted a little over 600 years (from
1300 to the end of WW I). At the other end, the Soviet state lasted less
than 100 years. Can we predict when a state is going to disintegrate?
How important is its size?
A prime example
of history as science can be found in another part of Gibbon's work [EG,
Chapter 5, vol. 1, pp. 101-102] that deals with large states. Gibbon presents
an argument about the size of the state needed for an oppressive regime.
He starts by citing studies that show that it is hard to maintain a standing
armed force that is more than 1% of the population of a state. He then
points out that a single person cannot terrorize 100 others and even 100
armed men cannot terrorize 10,000 people. But 10,000 soldiers can terrorize
a million people. That was roughly the size of the Praetorian Guard in
Rome that took effective control of the state after the death of Commodus.
If we accept Gibbon's argument we have to distinguish between small states
of a few hundred thousand people and states of a million or more people.
Of course not all large states become oppressive and we will search for
the reasons. All modern states exceed that critical population size while
many of the ancient states did not. One of the largest ancient states
the Achaemenid Persian Empire is estimated to have had around 50 million
people while the Roman Empire at its largest extent had over 70 million
people. These estimates are debatable but even if we assume that the population
was only a quarter of these estimates, it was still large enough to enable
oppressive regimes.
The uncivilized barbarians that overran the Western Roman
Empire came from small nomadic states that had developed no means of systematic
oppression of their citizens. That may be one reason why the states of
Western Europe were able not only to defeat the Roman armies, but also
to advance much farther ahead than the Eastern Roman Empire.
Bibliography
[GGS] |
Jared Diamond Guns, Germs, and
Steel, Norton, 1997-2005.
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[EG] | Edward Gibbon, The Decline and
Fall of the Roman Empire, first published in 1788.Note: I use the 1978 reprint of the 1910 Everyman's
Library (Dutton: New York) unabridged edition with comments by Oliphant Smeaton.
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